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Online Service Provider Copyright
Liability: Is the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act the Answer?
BY JUSTIN WILLIAMSON*
INTRODUCTION
he changes in society as a result of the Internet cannot be demed.
Not more than thirty years ago, high-speed computers were the
size of entire rooms and the concept of a personal computer
seemed drastically remote. The world moves rapidly in tins day and age,
and so does technology If only the same were true for the law.
Indeed, the advent of the Internet and its graphic interface, the World
Wide Web ("the Web"), has produced shortcuts as well as frustrations that
permeate each and every section of our lives. For example, electromc mail
("e-mail") is now used by millions of people as a quick and efficient means
by which to keep m contact with others across the world. At the same time,
most e-mail users have to deal with "junk e-mail," similar to the printed
solicitations delivered daily through the United States Postal Service. The
problem caused by e-mail is that the recipient is easier to locate and
contact, and once an address has been added to one of the (questionable)
mailing lists, the e-mail that reaches an "in-box" each day can become
aggravating and even offensive.
The law has not been immune to the benefits or problems caused bythe
Internet and the Web. For example, legal professionals, as well as students,
are now able to conduct their legal research from the comfort of their home
due to the broad online legal databases located on the Web. However, the
Web has also caused a number of legal problems ranging from personal
jurisdiction over the Internet1 to trade secret protection.2
J.D. expected 2001, Umversity of Kentucky.
See generally Katie Sako, Litigation and Jurisdiction, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY FORTHE INTERNET [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] §§ 8.1, 8.1-
8.9 (Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997).
2See Lewis C. Lee, Security Technologies, in INTELLECTUALPROPERTY, supra
note 1, §§ 3.2, 3.25.
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Perhaps one of the most difficult problems courts and lawmakers have
faced m recent years is that of copyright mfingement occurring online and
the parties who should be held liable. The earliest problems were caused by
Internet users who would post copyright protected pictures online.4 These
pictures were typically of an adult nature, explaining why such problems
did not receive a great deal of media coverage. However, as the technology
and capabilities of the Internet and the Web have advanced, online
copyright infringement has become more prevalent.
Online copyright infringement has gained the attention of the media
most recently due to the "pirating" ofmovies andunauthorized distribution
of such movies online. With the advent of MPEG5 technology, online
movie pirating is becoming more and more common. The 1999 release of
Star Wars: Episode I-The Phantom Menace 6 brought copyright infrmge-
ment on the Internet to the headlines of the news, as this movie has perhaps
become the most widely pirated film ever.7
The ease with which a movie can be pirated is alarming. A pirate can
simply record a showing of the movie using a hand-held digital camcorder,
which is usually small enough to fit into the pocket of a pair of pants. The
digital camcorder enables the pirate to transfer the digital film copy to his
personal computer using specialized software. The pirate then uses the
MPEG format to compress the film and upload it to the Internet. Obvi-
ously, such activities are of great concern to the large motion picture
studios of Hollywood. "The seven major American movie studios [lose]
about $250 million domestically and $2 billion to $3 billion internation-
ally"8 to movie pirating. The most staggering element ofthis statistic is the
fact that it does not include the losses due to Internet pirating.9
IWhile the entire intellectual property field has been affected by changes in
technology, this Note deals exclusively with copyright law.
4See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that the operator of a subscription computer bulletin board committed
copyright mfrmgement by placing photographs from Playboy magazine on his
billboard).
5 MPEG is an acronym for the Motions Picture Experts Group, which devel-
oped the technology. MPEG is a digital file format for compressing and playmg
video and audio clips transferred over the Internet. See Steve Wilson, Online
Piracy: From Music to Film, N.Y TIMES, July 29, 1999, at G1.
6 STAR WARS: EPISODE I-THE PHANTOM MENACE (Lucasfilin 1999).
See Wilson, supra note 5.
Sd.9See id.
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Typically, the "pirate" of the copyrighted material is not the crucial
party to a copyright infringement suit. The most important defendant m a
copyright suit becomes the party with the resources to answer monetarily
to an adverse judgment. In the context of copyright infringement on the
Internet, that party is the Internet Service Provider ("ISP"). During the
course of providing Internet access, an ISP may inadvertently engage m a
number of possible copyright-infringing activities. Thus, lawsuits involving
ISPs appeared on the horizon. As the frequency of copyright litigation
involving the Internet increased, Congress responded with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("Act"). 0 The Act, on its face, appears to
answer a number of complex questions regarding copyright law and the
digital age, most notably through the provisions of Title II: "Limitations on
liability relating to material online."'"I
However, as this Note points out, questions remain to be answered
regarding copyright infringement and the liability of ISPs. Part I of this
Note provides a brief overview of some general principles of copyright
infringement and their relation to the Internet. Part II discusses the
backdrop for the Act. Part III provides an overview analysis of the
requirements of Title II of the Act, while Part IV presents an analysis of the
case law governing copyright infringement as it relates to ISPs.
I. COPYRIGrHTS AND THE INTERNET
A. Copyright Infringement: The General Principles
Copyrights and the tort of copyright infringement are governedby Title
17 of the United States Code.'2 While the breadth of the coverage and the
intricacies of the Copyright Act 3 are seemingly endless, the general
concepts are relatively simple.
The Copyright Act provides "an exclusive ownershup right n a form of
expression."' 4 The rights can be created "in original works of authorship
fixed nany tangible medium ofexpression. from which [the works] can
beperceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated."' 5 Examples include
"o Digital Millennum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV
1998).
"Id.
12See generally 17 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
See id.
14 Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson, Intellectual Property and the Internet, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, §§ 1.1, 1.7
'5 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
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words on the printed (or electroic page), images attached to either paper
or videotape, and music recorded onto electrome tape or digital compact
discs. The work must also be fixed or attached to some medium through
which it may be viewed. 6 The Copyright Act defines material eligible for
copyright protection to include literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, choreographic works, pictorial and sculptural works, motion
pictures, soundrecordings, and architecturalworks.17 These categoneshave
been construed in abroadmanner. For example, courts have held computer
programs to be "copyrightable" as "literary works.' '
Assuming that the subject matter is eligible for a copyright, "copyright
protection involves two general requirements: (1) Original authorship; and
(2) Fixation."' 9 The requirement of originality has been viewed as perhaps
the most important aspect of qualifying a work as protected by copyright
law 2o While a considerable amount of case law, commentary and
discussion has been devoted to the concept of originality, "the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low 2 Most works, exhibiting a minimal
level of originality, pass the test.?2 The second requirement, fixation,
requires that the work be fixed in some tangible form of expression. "A
work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced or otherwise communicated for aperiod of more than transitory
duration." This is typically accomplished by transmitting the work in
some medium such as film, paper, compact disc, or cassette tape.24
Establishing a prima facie case of copyright infringement requires only
that the plamtiffprove "ownership" of a valid copyright and "copying" by
the defendant.25 "In tins context, 'copying' is 'shorthand for the mfringmg
,6 See id.
17 See id.
'8 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 817 (1st Cir. 1994),
aff'd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
'9 Lee & Davidson, supra note 14, § 1.9.
20 ee FeistPublications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
(stating that the "sine qua non of copyright is originality").21 Id. ("Original, as the term is used m copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.").
See id.
2 Marobie-Fl, Inc. v National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F Supp.
1167, 1177 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998)).
24See Lee & Davidson, supra note 14, § 1.9
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v Webbworld, Inc., 968 F Supp. 1171, 1174 (N.D.
Tex. 1997).
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of any ofthe copyright owner's [six] exclusive rights.' 26 While ownership
is established by a plaintiff "demonstrating that the material is 'copyright-
able' and that he complied with the statutory requirements in securing the
copyright. [C]opynght registrations are prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyrights and the information contained in the
certificates." 27
The tort of copyright infringement, in its most general sense, is a
violation of at least one of the six exclusive rights afforded authors holding
a copyright in their work.28 These rights are as follows:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work m copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomnimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) m the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graplc, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.29
While § 106 provides a copyright holder with a"bundle ofrights,"3 § 50131
details what constitutes copyright infringement. The most general act of
copyright infringement occurs when a person "Violates any ofthe exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118,"' 2
notwithstanding the defenses provided in these sections. Once these rights
26 Religious Tech. Ctr. v Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F Supp.
1361, 1367 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d
1081, 1085 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989)). 17 U.S.C. § 106 has been amended following this
case to include six exclusive rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
27 Webbworld, 968 F Supp. at 1174.
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
29Id
3od. § 106, cmt.
3 Id. § 501 (1994).321d. § 501(a).
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are violated, the violator is declared an "infringer of the copyright or right
of the author, as the case may be."33
Acknowledgmg the broad definition of a copyright infringer, courts
have historically analyzed copyright infringement under three umbrella
categories: "direct infringement, vicarious infringement and contributory
infringement." '34 Direct infringement occurs when a person affirmatively
acts to violate one of the author's six exclusive rights set out by § 106.11
For example, if a manuscript is sold that is a direct copy of a prior work,
and the prior work was copyrighted, the subsequent author would be liable
for direct infringement. Contributory infringement occurs when a person,
"with knowledge of the mfrmgmg activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the mfrmgmg conduct of another."' 6 For example, ifa person
provides the medium through which another may sell a copyrighted work,
the person would be liable for contributory infringement. Vicarious
infringement occurs when a person has "the right and ability to supervise
the mfrmgmg activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities."'37 Knowledge of the infringg activity is typically not required
under vicarious infringement. For example, if a writer for a magazine
simply copied an article that was copyrighted, the writer's employer may
be liable for vicarious infringement.38
These are the concepts that have shaped copyright law over the past
few decades. For the most part, they have been fluid enough to allow for
the application of the rule of law to changing fact patterns. However, with
the emergence of the Internet and the vast popularity of its graphic
interface, the Web, the copyright laws were in need of an update.
B. Copyright Infringement on the Internet: Paths to Infringement
Proving copying of a work through the use of a computer or the
Internet is not a difficult task. Courts have held that copying of a work
occurs when information is transferred from a permanent storage device to
33 Id.
31 Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service
Providers: Problem Solved For Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 826 (1999).
31 See id.36 Marobie-F1, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F Supp.
1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997).37Id. at 1179.31 See Beams, supra note 34, at 826-27
[VOL. 88
1999-2000] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
a computer's random access memory (CRAM"). 39 The simplest example of
this is when a work (an image, a written document, or other work) is
transferred from a floppy disk (or any "medium" from which a work can
be viewed40) to a computer's central processing unit ("CPU). 41
A very similar process occurs when a Web page is created. A Web
page designer creates the pages viewed through a Web browser (such as
Netscape Navigator or Microsoft's Internet Explorer) using hypertext
mark-up language ("HTML"). HTML is a computer code that enables
designs and layouts to be viewed with consistency by Web browsers
worldwide. Once a page is created and coded (using HTUL), the document
is copied and placed on a what is known as a server. Servers commumcate
with Web browsers, enabling a user to view a Web page. When a Web site
is requested by a Web browser using a uniform resource locator ("URL"),
which is essentially a Web site's address on the Internet, a conversation
occurs between the server and the Web browser. At its simplest, this
conversation consists of the Web browser stating "I want," and the server
responding with "here is," or "I don't have."'42 When the server provides
the information requested, it transmits the information to the requesting
Web browser, which in turn translates it to the user. The two computers
communicate using hypertext transfer protocol ("HTP"). This protocol is
the common thread that ties all computers together throughout the Web.
The Web is but a subset of the universe of the Internet using the specific
protocol of HTIP 4 3
ISPs are generally the entities that provide the use of servers, as well
as provide Internet access to millions of browsers. These dual capacities are
what enable ISPs to provide Internet access in its broadest sense: a
subscriber may either simply browse the Internet or he may choose to
create his own Web page. The latter group of users become the problem.
Perhaps the simplest example of copyright infringement involving an ISP
is that of the innocent ISP and the guilty subscriber. An aspiring Web
designer may decide to build a preliminary Web site. The designer will
obtain Internet access through an ISP and will design his page using
39 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir.
1993).40 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1998).
41 See MAISys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518.
4 2 DAVE TAYLOR, MAC WORLDS CREATING CooLaT HTML 3.2 WEB PAGES
240 (1997).
43 Other protocols include FTP (file transfer protocol), TCP (transfer com-
munications protocol), and PPP (point to point protocol).
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HTML. He may choose to incorporate certain images on Is Web page. As
he browses the Internet, he notices a particularly stunning photograph by
Ansel Adams and incorporates it as a background inage for Ins page. With
a simple click of the mouse the image is copied to his hard drive, and with
a few keystrokes the image is presented as the background of Ins Web
page. It should be clear that, assuming Ansel Adams holds a valid
copyright in his photograph, the designer has violated one of the six
exclusive rights of the copyright holder,' and having done so becomes "an
infringer of the copyright. '""
The question of liability for the ISP is more difficult because it requires
an understanding of how a computer server operates. In the context of
copyright infringement, one need only understand that when a Web page,
an image, or a text document is uploaded to a server, essentially a copy is
made and stored on the server. In fact, a number of copies of the uploaded
information may be made to increase the speed and efficiency of informa-
tion transfer. Senator Orrm Hatch, speaking in support of the Act,
summarized the dilemma of ISPs by stating that:
[S]ervice providers must make innumerable electromc copies in order
simply to transmit information over the Internet. Certain electronic copies
are made to speed up the delivery of information to users. Other electronic
copies are made in order to host World Wide Web sites. Many service
providers engage in directing users to sites m response to mqumes by
users or they volunteer sites that users may find attractive. Some of these
sites might contain infringing material."6
Thus, ISPs may easily commit copynght-infringing acts with little or no
knowledge of the action. The courts were quick to respond to the plight of
the copyright holder but perhaps lost sight of the ISPs in the process. As
will be seen, the Act provides limited protection for ISPs. But, in the event
an ISP does not qualify for the limitation on liability, the existing
precedent, which was in part a motivation for the creation of the Act,
governs.
4See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This section provides the
copyright holder with the exclusive right "(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work
in copies or phonorecords." Id.
s Id. § 501(a) (1994). See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968
F Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding the creators of a Web site liable for
infringement where copyrighted photos were displayed).
46 144 CONG. REC. S4845, S4884-06 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Hatch in support of the Act).
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II. ISPs AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT:
THE BACKDROP FOR THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Prior to the Act, ISPs were commonly found liable for either direct,
contributory, or vicarious infringement. While the law was strained in its
analysis, the emerging rule was becoming clear: there would be no safe
harbor for ISPs winch did not monitor the acts oftheir subscribers with the
most scrutinizing eye. The deep pockets of the ISPs were the easy targets
for copyright holders seeking damages. The typical infringer was a
computer hobbyist who held a day job while committing copyright
infringement during ns amateur Web construction hours at mght.
The ISPs received no aid from the Clinton Administration's Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights ("the Working Group"). In 1995, the
Working Group published its much-anticipated report outlining suggested
reforms in the law of intellectual property 47 The pertinent section of the
report recommended the adoption of a strict liability standard for ISPs
where subscribers engage in copyright infringing activities. 48 The worst
possible outcome for ISPs, and Internet users in general, would have been
legislative action adopting the recommendations. While adopting a
standard of strict liability may have been the easiest route, Congress chose
a more judicious, albeit complex, statutory answer.
Acknowledging that copyright laws have struggled to maintain
consistency as new technology develops, Congress providedISPs with safe
harbors to avoid liability for copyright mfringement.4 9 The safe harbors
were embodied in Title 11 of the Act " the "Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation."51 The Act
47SeelntellectualPropertyandtheNationallnformationlnfrastructure Execu-
tive Summary (visitedMar. 16,2000) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/
ipnii/execsum.html> [hereinafter Worlng Group on Intellectual PropertyRights].
For a complete compilation of the Working Group's report, see U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (Sept 1995).
48 See Worlang Group on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 47, at Other
Recommendations and Findings.
49 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (1998).
51 Digital Millenmum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV
1998).
" Id. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV 1998)).
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preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to
cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place
in the digital networked environment. At the same time, it provides
greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for
infringements that may occur in the course of their activities.52
The competing forces that created the backdrop for this legislation
were obviously at odds. On one side were the copyright industries (most
notably, major motion picture studios and the Motion Picture Association
of America), while on the other side were the ISPs including America
Online, Inc. (America's most far-reaching Internet service provider.53) The
clear tension lay in the incompatible interests of each group. The copyright
industries sought strong legislation to thwart the large-scale attempts at
piracy taking place over the Internet; the ISPs sought legislation limiting
the degree of liability for the deepest of pockets.
The policy behind providing limited liability for ISPs seems clear and
appears to make sense: the Internet is becoming increasingly important in
today's society, both as a medium for transporting information and as an
electromc marketplace. As such, its development depends on its increasing
speed and capacity 54 Without a limitation on liability ISPs may choose not
to invest in increasing these functions, thereby decreasing the efficiency of
the Internet as well as its use in society 55 The Act is the result of months
of negotiations between major constituents in the copyright industries and
major ISPs. The Act is not as much a victory for either side as it is a
compromise.56
III. TITLE II OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT:
THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. Introduction: The Threshold Provisions
The current state of the law regarding ISPs and copyright infringement
is governed by Title 11 of the Act.57 The Act was preceded by a long period
52 Beams, supra note 34, at 841 (quoting 144 CONG. REc. H10,048, H10,067
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Conference Report on H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium
Copyright Act)).
53 See Alan Deutschman, Yahoo!'s Secret Weapon, GQ, Oct. 1999, at 158, 163.
5 See 144 CONG. REC. S4845, S4884-06 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement
of Sen. Hatch in support of the Act).55 See id.56 See Infra Parts III and IV
5' Digital Millenmum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. IV
1998).
[VOL. 88
1999-2000] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
of negotiations and two prior proposals.58 The Act, as signed into law on
October 28, 1998, is comprehensive and exhaustive. The pure breadth of
its coverage appears to have definitively answered the question of
copyright liability for ISPs; however, the requirements, as will be shown,
are highly formalistic and complex. Such requirements may very well lead
to inadvertent oversights disqualifying ISPs from the limitations on
liability.
The full body of the Act covers far more than the limitation on liability
for ISPs5 9 Nonetheless, this Note is concerned exclusively with Title II
which amends Title 17 of the United States Code by adding a new section
entitled: "Limitations of liability relating to material online."
1. What is a "Service Provder"?
As a threshold matter, to be eligible for the limitations on liability, an
ISP must first qualify under one of § 512's definitions of a "service
provider."61 The Act immediately becomes complex by providing two
separate definitions of "service provider." For the purposes of the
limitation on liability for a service provider engaged in "Transitory Digital
Network Commumcations,"'62 the term "'service provider' means an entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online commumcations, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the
material as sent or received."'63 For the purposes of any other subsection,
"service provider" is defined as "a provider of online services or network
access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity
described in subparagraph (A)."6
The effect of this bifurcated definition is that the techical definition
supplied by § 512(k)(1)(A) is used to qualify a service provider for the
5 See STEPHEN J. DAVIDSON ET AL., THE LAW OF CYBERSPACE LIABILITY OF
INFORMATION SERVICE PROVIDERS 1999, at 143, 159-60 (PLI Pats., Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 574, 1999).
" The Act consists of five titles: Title I-WIPO TREATIES IMPLEMENTATION;
Title 11--ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABLITY LIMITATION; Title III-
COMPUTER MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR COPYRIGHT EXEMPTION; Title IV-
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS; and Title V-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN ORIGINAL
DESIGNS. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202(a).
6o Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202(a).611d. § 512(k).
621d. § 512(a).
63 Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
6Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
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limitation on liability pertaining to transitory digital network communica-
tions. The second, more general definition provided by § 512(k)(1)(B)
applies to all other service provider sections and encompasses those entities
contemplated by the first definition. As one legal commentator wrote:
Both definitions clearly contemplate such entities asNetcom Comnmumca-
tions and MCI WorldCom, wlch serve as conduits m transporting
messages from computer to computer across the Internet. The second
definition also clearly encompasses "traditional" Internet or online
[service providers] such as America Online, Prodigy, Yahoo!, and bulletin
board services. 6
5
The first definition may also be broadly read so as to encompass businesses
providing employee e-mail accounts as well as media companies hosting
strictly informational Web sites. Because the definitions place no such
limits on the breadth of their inclusions, ultimately the line must be drawn
by the courts.66
2. The Conditions for Eligibility
Once an ISP has qualified under one ofthe aforementioned definitions,
it must then comply with the "Conditions For Eligibility ,67 The Act
specifies two conditions for eligibility but further qualifies them. The first
condition is that the ISP must have "adopted and reasonably
implemented" 6 a policy that provides for the discontinuation of a
subscriber's account m"appropriate circumstances" 69 where the subscriber
is a "repeat"7 ° copyright infringer. There appear to be ambiguities on the
face of the statute which may create pitfalls for an ISP attempting to
comply with the safe harbor. While these ambiguities are beyond the scope
of tis Note and will, no doubt, be fleshed out by courts in the coming
years, one can easily observe the difficulties in determining the differences
between adopting and "reasonably" implementing a policy, as well as the
equally ambiguous "appropriate circumstances" under which the policy
6 Elizabeth A. McNamara et al., Online Service Provider Liability Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 COMM. LAW 5 (Fall 1999).66See id.
67Digital Millenmum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (Supp. IV
1998).68 Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
69 d
7d.
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must provide for discontinuation of services. In addition, a question arises
as to whether the ISP must terminate the accounts of repeat infringers who
have allegedly only infringed a handful of times or if the ISP has a
considerable amount of discretion in making these determinations. In
sinply meeting the first qualification for a limitation on liability, the seeds
of litigation appear to have been sown.
The complexity of the Act continues with the second mandatory
qualification: the ISP must accommodate and not "interfere with standard
technical measures."' Obviously, whether or not an ISP has met this
second qualification will turn on what is regarded as a "standard technical
measure." The Act defines "standard technical measures" as ones "that are
used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works."
Unfortunately, the Act does not stop here. It provides three separate
qualifications in addition to the above definition. The technical measures
must "(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright
owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-mdustry
standards process; (B) [be] available to any person on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms; and (C) not impose substantial costs on
service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks."1'
Once an ISP has met the initial threshold requirements under the Act's
definitions of a service provider and the conditions for eligibility, the
question then becomes whether the ISP qualifies for each specific
limitation on liability. The specific conditions for each limitation on
liability are as long as they are complex and a thorough analysis is beyond
the scope of this Note. Thus, while only a brief sketch of the specific
sections is provided, the sketch, accompaniedby the foregoing discussion,
should permit some understanding of the complexity of the Act as well as
the ease with which an ISP may lose its safe harbor protections.
B. The Specific Limitations on Liability
1. Transitory Digital Network Communications
The first specific limitation on liability is provided for an ISP winch is
engaged in "Transitory Digital Network Communications."74 Under this
limitation, an ISP will not be held liable for copyright mifrngement where
the ISP has transmitted material through a network controlled or operated
71 Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
7Id. § 512(i)(2).
7 Id. § 512(i)(2)(A)-(C).
74Id. § 512(a).
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by the ISP, or for the storage of such material during its transmission.75 An
ISP providing e-mail access is the clearest example of being engaged in
transitory digital network communications.
However, the Act continues its pattern of complexity by providing five
specific qualifications which must be met for the safe harbor. First,
someone other than the ISP must have initiated the sending of the
material.76 Second, the ISP must conduct the transmission or storage of the
material, without making any individual selection, during an "automatic
technical process."' Third, the ISP may not select recipients of the material
unless directed to do so by another.7" Fourth, if a copy of the material is
stored on a network during transmission, the manner in which it is stored
must be such that the material may only be accessed by the intended
recipients; in addition, the material may not be stored longer than is
"reasonably necessary" for its transmission. 9 Finally, the material may not
be modified by the ISP during its transmission. 0
2. System Caching
The second specific limitation on liability is provided for an ISP which
engages in "system cachmg." 8' The Act defines "system caching" m a
broad way by providing that an ISP shall not be liable for copyright
infringement "by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of
material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider." 2 Thus, where an ISP, during the course of providing services,
stores material on its system or network which may be copyright protected,
the ISP is protected from a copyright infringement suit.
As with the other sections of the Act, tis limitation on liability has
specific conditions which must be met. First, the material must be placed
online by someone other than the service provider. 3 Second, the material
must be transmitted by the person through the ISP's network to a person
other than the transmitting person at the direction of this other person. 4
75See id.
Se id. § 512(a)(1).
77Id. § 512(a)(2).
78 See id. § 512(a)(3).
7 See id. § 512(a)(4).
'0See id. § 512(a)(5).
81Id. § 512(b).
82Id. § 512(b)(1).
83 See id. § 512(b)(1)(A).
4 See zd. § 512(b)(1)(B). The essence of this requirement appears to be that (1)
the ISP cannot initiate the transmission of the cached material; (2) the person
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Third, the process by which the material is stored on the network must be
an automatic and technical one which makes the material available to users
of the system or network who, after the material is transmitted by the
person other than the ISP, request access to the material from the transmit-
ting person.85
Provided an ISP qualifies under these conditions, it must then satisfy
the following five conditions. First, the material stored on the ISP's
networkimust betransmittedwithout modification bythe ISP 86 Second, the
ISP must comply with rules regarding the updating of the transmitted and
stored material which are specified by the transmitting person and are in
accordance with generally accepted industry standards for these proce-
dures. However, if the transmitting person attempts to use such rules to
impair the temporary storage of the material by the ISP (system caching),
this condition does not apply. 7
Third, the ISP may not interfere with technology which may provide
the transmittingpersonthe abilityto obtain information from the requesting
person which the transmitting person would have been able to obtain if the
transmitted material had been requested in some other fashion (other than
through electromc commumcations). 8  However, tis third condition only
applies if the technology (1) does not significantly impair the ability of the
ISP to intermediately store the material; (2) "is consistent with generally
accepted industry standard communications protocols;"89 and (3) extracts
no information from the ISP's network except that wich would have been
obtainable by the requesting person from the transmitting person had the
requesting person obtained the material directly from the transmitting
person.90
Fourth, if the transmitting person has established a viewing fee or
password verification process for users requesting the material, the ISP
must allow access to the material "in significant part"9' only to those
subscribers who have complied with such conditions and in accordance
with those conditions. 9 Fifth, if the transmitting person's transnssion of
initiating the transmission must be transmitting the material to someone other than
himself; and (3) the material must have been requested by someone other than the
transmitting person or the ISP
"See id. § 512(b)(1)(C).
86 id. § 512(b)(2)(A).
S7 id. § 512(b)(2)(B).
See d. § 512(b)(2)(C).
19Id. § 512(b)(2)(C)(ii).
9 See id. § 512(b)(2)(C)(iii).
91 Id. § 512(b)(2)(D).
' See id.
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such material constitutes copyright infringement and the ISP is informed
of such infringement, the ISP must respond by removing or disabling
access to such material . 3 However, this condition embodies its own
limitations. The fifth condition applies only if the material was previously
removed from its original site or if access to the site where the material
originated has been disabled, or where a court has ordered the material be
removed from the original site. In addition, the party giving notification of
the alleged copyright infringement must provide in the notice a statement
verifying that the above condition has been fulfilled. 4
Assuming an ISP fulfills these requirements in their entirety, the ISP
will be granted a statutory limitation on liability for copyright iiffingement
arising from the activity of system caching.
3. Information Residing on Systems
or Networks at the Direction of Users
The third specific limitation on liability is provided for an ISP which
stores information on its system or network at the direction of its users. 95
This limitation is perhaps the most important, as it appears to alleviate the
problems courts were dealing with prior to its enactment.96 The Act states
that an ISP will not be liable for copyright infringement "by reason of the
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider."9 This
limitation broadly covers any potentially infringing material that is placed
on an ISP's network or system at the direction of one of its subscribers.
The Act once again provides numerous conditions that must be fulfilled
before an ISP may qualify for the limitation on liability The first condition
is that the ISP must "not have actual knowledge that the material or an
activity using the material on the system or network is iringing."98 The
Act further narrows this by requiring that "in the absence of such actual
knowledge, [the ISP] not [be] aware of facts or circumstances from which
ifrfinging activity is apparent." If the ISP obtains either actual knowledge
or becomes aware of such facts, it must then act "expeditiously" in
93See id. § 512(b)(2)(E).
9 See id. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii).
9 See id. § 512(c).96 See infra Part IV
97 Digital Millennum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (Supp. IV
1998).
9 1 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
9 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
1002 [VOL. 88
1999-2000] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
removing or disabling access to the infringing material."° This condition
appears to be consistent with case law dealing with contributory infringe-
ment where knowledge is a key element.
The second condition is that the ISP may not receive a "financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing [material or] activity" where
the ISP "has the right and ability to control such activity " 101 Tis condi-
tion also appears to be consistent with case law involving vicarious
liability
The third condition is that once an ISP is notified of an alleged
infringement, it must respond "expeditiously" to remove the infringing
material or deny access to the activity involving the material alleged to be
mfrngmg. 2 This third condition appears to be consistent with case law
dealing with both contributory and vicarious infringement.
In addition to the foregoing conditions, the ISP must have designated
an agent to receive notification of alleged copynght-infringing materials or
activities.0 3 To correctly designate an agent under the Act, the ISP must not
only identify the agent and make the agent available through its Web site
in such a manner as is accessible to the public, but also provide the
Copyright Office with "substantially the following reformation:"' 4 "(A)
the name, address, phone number, and electromc mail address of the agent.
(B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights may deem
appropriate."' 1 5 Pursuant to the Act, the Register of Copyrights will
maintain a directory of agents which may be funded by a fee paid by
ISPs.' ° The Act also specifies in detail the elements of qualifying
notification. 7 The statutory elements of a valid notification are set forth
m two parts and multiple subparts. 08
The Act continues with sections regarding related matters. 1 1 The
matters dealt with include information location tools,"'0 limiting the
"o See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
11 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
103 See id. § 512(c)(2).
104 Id.
10 d. § 512(c)(2)(A)-(B).
'0o See id.
107 See id. § 512(c)(3).
'o See id. (setting out the detailed requirements for notification).
'o These sections have been omitted from the discussion because they are
beyond the scope of this Note and the cases discussed hereto.
"o See Digital Millenmum Copyright Act § 202(a), 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp.
IV 1998).
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liability of nonprofit educational institutions,"' misrepresentations
regarding notice of infringing activity and removal of infringng works, 112
replacement of removed material,113 subpoenas,114 and injunctions." 5
IV FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
AND THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW
A. The Negative Implications of a Limitation on Liability
The Act limits liability when certain conditions are met. It necessarily
follows that when those conditions are not met, the limitation on liability
ceases to exist. The question then becomes, what is the status of the law for
an ISP which has not complied with the provisions of the Act? Tis
question appears to have an easy answer: the standard copyright provisions
of Title 17 of the United States Code will apply Indeed, this conclusion is
supported by the Act itself which states specifically that "[t]he failure of a
service provider's conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this
section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the
service provider that the service provider's conduct is not mfrmgmg under
this title or any other defense." 6 Thus, the logical conclusion is that should
an ISP fail to attain a statutory limitation on liability, it will expose itself
to the full range of actions and remedies available to a copyright holder.
The original copyright laws did not contemplate the myriad advance-
ments of technology, and most notably, the Internet. This conclusion is
evident from the emerging case law applying copyright lawto ISPs accused
of copyright infringement. While the Act provides a safety net for ISPs
which comply with its requirements, ISPs which fail to do so proceed at
their own risk.
At the sinplest level, and before a copyright infringement suit may
proceed, the plaintiff must prove two elements: "(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original."" 7 The first element's requirement is most easily met by obtaining
.' See id. § 512(e).
" See id. § 512(f).
" See id. § 512(g).
14 See id. § 512(h).
' See id. § 512(0).
16 Id. § 512(1).
" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
1004 [VOL. 88
1999-2000] THE DIGIrAL MILLENNIM COPYRIGHT ACT
a Certificate of Copyright Registration. If a certificate is obtained, it
constitutes prima facie evidence ofa valid copyright.' 8 Once the presump-
tion of a valid copyright is created, the burden rests with the defendant to
rebut the presumption." 9 Thus, unless the validity of the copyright is
affirmatively rebutted, a copyright holder need only show unauthorized
copying to establish a cause for copyright infringement 2 0
B. The Governing but Conflicting Precedent
1. Cases Holding ISPs Liable
Perhaps one of the very earliest cases concerning copyright infringe-
ment and the Internet did not involve what is now known as an ISP The
case involved an electroic bulletin board operator, which is substantially
similar to an ISP in that the operator performs some of the most basic
functions of an ISP. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena2 1 presented an
electromc bulletin board service ("BBS") operated by the defendant,
George Frena.'1 The operation of a BBS is substantially similar to the
service provided by an ISP, and thus the case provides an early look at the
reaction of law to the emerging technology
A BBS is essentially a service provided to paying customers who may
access it through the use of a modem and telephone line. BBS operators
provide access to information directories, e-mail, and the Web. They do
so, however, on a much smaller scale than the major ISPs, hence they are
typically characterized as local Internet service providers.'2 The custo-
mers pay a fee to the BBS operator and are then permitted to browse
through a number of directories containing information that may be
downloaded. 24
Frena's BBS mainly contained graphic files or digital copies of
photographs, many of winch were of an adult nature. Frena's customers
could browse the pictures and download those which they wished to keep.
"
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1994).
"9 See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 832 (10th Cir.
1993).
n2 See id.
121 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
12
, See id. at 1554.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F Supp. 503,505
(N.D. Ohio 1997).
"' Downloading is the process by which rnformation is transferred from a
remote storage site to a user's computer. See id. at 505.
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The customers also could upload'25 pictures of their own for other
customers to view While Frena maintained the BBS and had access to the
information stored thereon, he was not aware of who posted information,
when it was posted, or what was being posted on his BBS at any given
time.126
One hundred and seventy images stored on Frena's BBS were copies
of photographs contained in Playboy Enterprises, Inc.'s ('TEr) copy-
righted material.'2 Frena admitted the images were displayed on his BBS,
that their display was never authorized by PEI, that each displayed image
was substantially similar to the copyrighted work, and that each of the
images in question had been downloaded by one of his customers. 2 8 Frena
also testified that he had never uploaded any of the images in question but
that subscribers had uploaded them. He stated that as soon as he received
notice of the infringing activity, he removed the images and monitored the
BBS to avoid further infringing activity 129
PEI clearly owned copyrights in the images by holding valid copyright
registrations in each publication in which the photographs were
displayed.'30 Thus, PEI only needed to prove that Frena had copied the
images without its authorizationm3 The court noted that
[s]ince direct evidence of copying is rarely available in a copyright
infringement action, copymg maybe inferentially proven by showing that
[the] Defendant had access to the allegedly infringed work, that the
allegedly mfrmgng work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work,
and that one of the rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners is
implicated by [the Defendant's] actions. 132
This standard had clear, far-reaching ramifications for Frena. Because
Playboy is amajor publication, selling over 3.4 million copies inthe United
States each month, the court deemed access to the copyrighted work as
'" Uploading is the converse of downloading; it is the process by which
information is transferred from a user's computer to a remote storage site. See id.
126 See Frena, 839 F Supp. at 1554, 1559.
12 7 See id. at 1554.
"2 See id.
129 See id.
30 See id. at 1556.
'3' See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir.
1993).
"I Frena, 839 F Supp. at 1556 (citations omitted).
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"essentially undemable."' 3 The substantial similarity requirement was met
by Frena's own admission' and the court readily stated that many of the
images were "essentially exact copies."1 5
The court concludedthat Frena had violated one of the exclusive rights
guaranteed to copyright holders, namely the right of distribution. 136
Copyright law grants the holder the exclusive right to "distribute copies
of the copyrighted work to the public"' 37 and to "display the copyrighted
work publicly "38 The court concluded rather easily "that Defendant Frena
supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted
work."'139 The court also added that it was of no significance that Frena had
not actually made the copies himself. '
The court continued in its analysis, noting that the display rights of a
copyright holder could be implicatedby the use of computer technology 141
The court broadly construed the display right and further quoted from the
House of Representatives report which stated that the display right covers
"the projection of an image on a screen or other surface by any method, the
transmission of an image by electromc or other means, and the showing of
an image on a cathode ray tube, or similar viewing apparatus connected
with any sort of information storage and retrieval system."'42 The Frena
court drew the inference from this legislative history that "[t]he display
right precludes unauthorized transmission of the display from one place to
another, for example, by a computer system." 43
The court's final conclusion and holding, while brief, contained
exceptionally strong language and far-reaching implications for BBS
operators and ISPs. It stated:
There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringement in this
case. It does not matter that Defendant Frena may have been unaware of
the copyright infringement. Intent to infringe is not needed to find
133 Id.
134 See zd. at 1554.
135 Id. at 1556.
136 See id.
137 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
'3' Id. § 106(5).
139Frena, 839 F Supp. at 1556.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 1556-57
142 Id. (quoting H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5677).
14 3 Id. at 1557
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copyright mfi-ingement Intent or knowledge is not an element of
infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable for infringe-
ment; 144
The court was correct in stating that intent or knowledge is not part of the
copyright statute. The court, however, held Frena liable for direct
infringement rather than contributory infringement. 45 The problem lies in
the fact that Frena himselfnever actually copied, distributed, or displayed
any ofthe images. He provided a service to paying customers who engaged
m copyright-infringing acts through the use of the service. In short, Frena
unknowingly provided the means by which his customers committed
copyright infringement."
The difficulty m the analysis again comes from the complexity of the
technology The court's overstatement is perhaps easier to grasp when the
facts are simplified. Frena essentially operated a public bulletin board.
However, to view items posted on the bulletin board, or to post items,
subscribers paid a fee. The subscribers posted images illegally copied from
Playboy Frena did not copy the images nor did he post them. Frena simply
supplied a bare bulletin board for the use of his subscribers. It was the
subscribers who violated PEI's exclusive right to copy the works, and who
further violated PEI's display right by posting the images on the bulletin
board. However, the court held Frena, the supplier of the bulletin board,
liable for the acts of all the subscribers. 47
In the wake of the Frena decision, one prudent measure for a BBS
operator would be to institute a screening process whereby material
uploaded to the BBS is monitored to ensure that copyright infringement
does not occur. However, four years later, on almost identical facts, aBBS
operator was found liable for direct copyright infringement based on the
fact that such a process was m place.
The facts of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.141
were largely identical to those in Frena except in two respects. Russ
Hardenburgh, President of Rusty-N-Edie's, Inc. (a BBS), was sued by PEI
for copyright infringement allegedly occurring when certain copyrighted
images were displayed on Hardenburgh's BBS. Hardenburgh asserted that
144 Id. at 1559.
'
45 See id.
146 See id. at 1554.
147 See id. at 1556, 1559.
148 Playboy Enters., Inc. v Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F Supp. 503 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
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he had never uploaded any of PEI's copyrighted images nor did he or
anyone working for the BBS have knowledge of any infringing activity 14 9
Hardenburgh described hinselfand the BBS as essentially what they were:
"passive providers of the space in which the pictures were passed from one
party to another."'' 0
Hardenburgh's BBS, however, was somewhat more advanced than
Frena's service. Recognizmg the need to provide a larger amount of
information to ins subscribers to compete with the major ISPs, Harden-
burgh offered incentives to his subscribers to upload new information to the
BBS.51 Hardenburgh also instituted a policy whereby each file that was
uploaded to the BBS was screened by a BBS employee to ensure the
information was acceptable."' Hardenburgh testified that this screening
process sought to eliminate pornographic images and works that were
"blatantly protected by copyright. 15 3 Thus, Hardenburgh had instituted
what appeared to be a prudent policy following the decision in Frena. The
policy, however, turned out to be the key factor in finding Hardenburgh
liable for direct copyright infringement.
The court made its way through the copyright analysis, finding that PEI
held a valid copyright and that copying of the copyrighted images had
occurred."M The court noted in its analysis that the Frena case consisted of
similar facts.55 However, the Hardenburgh court characterized Frena as
"even more of a passive participant in the copying and exchange of
copyrighted photographs than are the Defendants in this case." 156 It came
to this conclusion based on the fact that Frena's subscribers were able to
upload information to the BBS directly without a review by the BBS's
employees. Conversely, Hardenburgh's subscribers uploaded information
which was then reviewed by the BBS employees before being placed on the
BBS. Thus, the court found such a review to be a more active participation
in the infringing activity than was present in Frena.'s7
'
49 See id. at 509.
150 d.
1' The incentives generally consisted of a credit for each megabyte of infor-
mation uploaded to the BBS. Each credit, m turn, entitled the subscriber to down-
load 1.5 megabytes of information under the subscription agreement. See id. at
506.
'
5 2 See id.
1Id.
' See id. at 511.
See id.
15 6 1d.
157See id.
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The court, however, disagreed with the holding m Frena that "direct
copyright infringement requires some element of direct action or
participation." ' It based its analysis on the fact that the Copyright Act
reserves certain activities for the holder of the copyright. Thus, to commit
an infringement one must engage m one of those activities. The court
concluded that creating or operating a BBS was not one of those activities.
Nonetheless, the Hardenburgh decision indicates that the creation or
operation of a BBS is an appropriate activity for contributory copyright
infringement. 15
9
The court continued m its analysis, finding that the direct action
requirement had been met by virtue of the BBS's screening process. 60 The
court reasoned that by engaging m this activity Hardenburgh had been
transformed "from [a] passive provider[ ] of a space in which infringing
activities happened to occur to [an] active participant[ ] in the process of
copyright infringement.' 61 Thus, in its attempt to limit its exposure to
liabilities, Hardenburgh's BBS had, in fact, sealed its fate.
The court also held the BBS liable for contributory copyright infringe-
ment. Using the established contributory mnfingement rule that "[a] party
shall be liable where it, 'with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another,""'62 the court found that Hardenburgh "clearly induced, caused,
and materially contributed to any infringing activity which took place on
[Ns] BBS."'163 Further, the court held that Hardenburgh "[a]lso had at least
constructive knowledge that infringing activity was likely to be occurring
on [hIs] BBS."'' 1 Thus, not only had the BBS's screening policy lead to
direct liability, but it had also provided the requisite knowledge and
inducement factors needed for contributory liability 165
158 Id. at 512.
9 See id. at 512-13.
160 The court found that two facts were critical to its holding: (1) the BBS
encouraged the uploading of files, and (2) the BBS screened all such files before
they were placed on the BBS. See id. at 513. Discussion of the first factor has been
intentionally omitted because the court's treatment of this factor is sparse at best,
while the screening process appears to be determinative. See id.
161 Id
62 Id. at 514 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists, 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
163 Id.
164 Id.
'65 See id.
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2. Cases Holding ISPs Not Liable
At least one court has been sympathetic to an ISP's plight. The relevant
facts m Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc.," although similar, were somewhat more convoluted. The
Religious Technology Center andBridge Publications, Inc., both California
non-profit corporations, brought a copyright mfringement suit against a
Usenet167 subscriber, aBBS operator, and atrue ISP 68 The suit allegedthat
Denms Erlich (the Usenet subscriber), a former minister of the Church of
Scientology, 69 hadinfringed copyrightedmaterial when he postedportions
of works by L. Ron Hubbard 7° on his newsgroup.' 71 The claim also
asserted direct, contributory, and vicarious liability against the BBS
operator through whom Erlich gained access to the Internet via Netcom
(the ISP).1
While claims were made against Erlich, the BBS operator, andNetcom,
the pertinent claim to this discussion is the claim against Netcom. As a
11 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Lme Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
167 The Usenet has been described as
a worldwide community of electronic BBSs that is closely associated with
the Internet and with the Internet community. The messages in Usenet are
orgamzed into thousands of topical groups, or "Newsgroups" As a
Usenet user, you read and contribute ("post") to your local Usenet site.
Each Usenet site distributes its users' postings to other Usenet sites based
on various implicit and explicit configuration settings, and m turn receives
postings from other sites. Usenet is read and contributed to on a daily
basis by a total population of millions of people Usenet traffic flows
over a wide range of networks, including the Internet and dial-up phone
links.
Id. at 1365 n.4 (citing DANIEL P DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS
196-97 (1994)).
... The term "true ISP" is used only to distinguish between an ISP and the BBS
operator which has been analogized to an ISP previously. Netcom, the ISP named
as a defendant here, was considered one of the largest ISPs operating in the United
States in 1995; it was likened to America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe by the
court. See id. at 1368.69 See id. at 1365.
70 L. Ron Hubbard was the founder of the Church of Scientology. He is now
deceased, but the plaintiffs m the case held copyrights mmany of his published and
unpublished works. See id.
'
7 1 See id., see supra note 167 (describing briefly the Usenet and its corres-
ponding "newsgroups").
11 See Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F Supp. at 1365-66.
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general ISP, Netcom can be distinguished from the BBSs seen in Frena"
andHardenburgh. 174 The BBSs m the previous cases operated on somewhat
limited scales in that they had a limited amount of subscribers andprovided
a limited amount of information over which they were viewed to have
control. Netcom, however, provided general Internet access. 7  The
distinction played an important part in the court's analysis.
An important distinction also exists between the claims asserted agamst
Netcom and those asserted in Frena and Hardenburgh. The copyright
infringement claim against Netcom was apparently only that of the actual
reproduction of the works on Netcom's computers. 76 In Frena and
Hardenburgh, the claims were of infringement of the copyright holder's
exclusive right to publicly distribute and display the works. Also of
importance is that after unsuccessfully attempting to stop Erlich from
posting the copyrighted material, the plaintiffs informed the BBS operator
and Netcom of the infringing activity Both the BBS operator and Netcom
asked the plaintiffs to provide proof of the valid copyrights in the posted
material. The plaintiffs refused the request. 77
After establishing that valid copyrights in the specified works existed,
the court turned to the issue of Netcom's possible liability for copyright
infringement. The facts underlying this claim were basically undisputed,1
78
and were aptly stated by the court:
Erlich connects to [the] BBS using a telephone and a modem. Erlich then
transmits Ins messages to [the BBS's] computer, where they are automati-
cally briefly stored. According to a prearranged pattern established by
Netcom's software, Erlich's initial act of posting a message to the Usenet
results in the automatic copying of Erlich's message from [the BBS's]
computer onto Netcom's computer and onto other computers on the
Usenet. In order to ease transmission and for the convemence of Usenet
users, Usenet servers maintain postings from newsgroups for a short
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
1 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F Supp. 503 (N.D.
Oluo 1997).
175 See Religious Tech. Cr., 907 F Supp. at 1366.
176 See id. at 1370. However, the court believed that the plaintiffs may have
been asserting veiledpublic distribution and display arguments and addressed these
separately. See id. at 1371-72.
' See id. at 1366. The court found this evidence to be unpersuasive as to the
claim of direct infringement but viewed it as integral to the claim of contributory
infringement where knowledge is an element. See id. at 1372, 1374, 1383.
171 See id. at 1367
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period of time-eleven days for Neteom's system and three days for [the
BBS's] system. Once on Netcom's computers, messages are available to
Netcom's customers and Usenet neighbors, who may then download the
messages to their own computers. Netcom's local server makes available
its posting to a group of Usenet servers, which do the same for other
servers until all Usenet sites worldwide have obtained access to the
postings, which takes a matter of hours.
179
The court also noted that:
Netcom does not create or control the content of the information available
to its subscribers. It also does not monitor messages as they are posted. It
has, however, suspended the accounts of subscribers who violated its
terms and conditions, such as where they had commercial software m
their posted files. 18
Because the complaint alleged direct, contributory, and vicarious
copyright infringement, the court dealt with each allegation separately "I
The court quickly established that copies were made by the reproductions
created on each party's computer."' Netcom asserted as a defense that it
had not taken any affirmative action causing or enabling the copying, ls3
much like the defense acceptedby the court mHardenburgh. TheReligious
Technology Center court also accepted the defense here as to direct
infringement. It held that:
Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system that automatically
and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through it is not
unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make
copies with it. [C]ourts analyze the machine owner's liability under
the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement. 184
The court reasoned that if it were to allow direct infringement liability in
such a situation, the decision would open the door to liability for every
179 Id. at 1367-68.
180 Id. at 1368.
'
81 The court's lengthy discussion of vicarious infringement liability is not
treated here because the direct and contributory liability discussions serve to
illustrate the thesis of this Note. Incidentally, the court dismissed the claim of
vicarious copyright mfingement. See id. at 1375-77
112 See id. at 1368.
183 See id.
184 Id. at 1369.
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Usenet server who had held or transmitted Erlich's posting at any given
time. The court wisely felt such wide-sweepmg liability was not contem-
plated by the Copyright Act when the actual direct infringer was easily
ascertainable." 5
Tins holding appears to be directly contrary to the decision m Frena.
The appearance is both correct and incorrect, however. The conflict resides
m the fact that the court chose to distinguish the Frena holding, and
comment on it m a contradictory fashion. The court clearly dispenses with
the Frena reasoning by distinguishing the clain before it. In Frena, the
court found the BBS liable for violating the plaintiff's right to public
display and distribution.186 In Religious Technology Center, the plaintiffs
alleged copyright infringement based on the actual copying by the
computers involved rather than public distribution or display 1 7 The court
found that the reasoning of the Frena court had "no bearing on the issue of
direct liability for unauthorized reproductions"' 8 and therefore held "that
the storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and retransmission
to other servers is not a direct infringement of the exclusive right to
reproduce the work where such copies are uploaded by an infringing
user."
189
The analysis of the court is clear enough: the plaintiffs did not allege
copyright mfi-mgement by public display or distribution, but rather by the
act of copying itself. The court, however, did not allow its holding to stand
on this reasoning. In a footnote to its discussion, the court states that
"[g]iven the ambiguity in plaintiffs' reference to a violation of the right to
'publish' and to [Frena], it is possible that plaintiffs are also claiming that
Netcom infringed their exclusive right to publicly distribute their works.
The court will address this argument mfra."' 90 This statement directly
contradicts the facts on which the court based its holding. The two
sentences prior to the footnote remark: "plaintiffs do not argue that Netcom
is liable for its public distribution of copies. Instead, they claim that
Netcom is liable because its computers in fact made copies." '
The question thus becomes whether the Religious Technology Center
court rejected the reasoning and holding of Frena or simply distinguished
185 See id. at 1369-70.
'
86 See supra notes 121-147 and accompanying text.
187 SeeReligious Tech. Ctr., 907 F Supp. at 1370.
188 Id.
89 Id. at 1371.
190 Id. at 1370 n.15.
91Id. at 1370.
1014 [VOL. 88
1999-2000] THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
the facts before it. The answer is that it did both. The court concluded that
because the plaintiffs both argued that Netcom was liable for "main-
tam[ing] copies of [Erlich's] messages on its server for eleven days for
access by its subscribers"'" and made reference to Frena, the plaintiffs
might have been arguingthe infringing activitywas public distribution. The
court addressed this argument because it found such reference "could be an
attempt" 93 to make such an argument. Because the court created an
argument that was neither in the complaint nor presented on appeal, the
court complicated matters further in its discussion.
The Religious Technology Center court expressed some disdain for the
Frena holding, albeit in dicta. The court was not "entirely convinced that
the mere possession of a digital copy on a BBS that is accessible to some
members of the public constitutes direct mfringement."'" The court
believed that "[w]here the BBS merely stores and passes along all
messages sent by its subscribers and others, the BBS should not be seen as
causing these works to be publicly distributed or displayed,"'95 especially
where the individual who posted the material is identifiable. 96
Again, this discussion was clearly dicta because the court chose to
distinguish the facts before it. The court observed that, unlike the ISP in
Frena, Netcom did not maintain archives of its subscribers files.'97 The
court also noted that Netcom did not create or control any of the informa-
tion it provided for its subscribers: "[Netcom] merely provides access to
the Internet, whose content is controlled by no single entity " 98 Because of
these facts, the court concluded Netcom could not be seen as "suppl[ying]
a product."'" The court found that allowing the actions of Netcom to
constitute copyright infringement would "involve an unreasonably broad
construction of public distribution and display rights."'' Thus, the
Religious Technology Center court, while expressing mild disapproval of
the Frena holding, distinguished the facts of the case before it in coming
to its determination.
Nevertheless, by distinguishing the facts before it, the court left the
door open for direct infiingement liability on the part of some ofNetcom's
192 d. at 1371.
193 Id. at 1372.
194 Id.
19 5 Id.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 Id.
199 Id.200 Id
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large competitors. Early m its opinion, the court separated Netcom from
other large ISPs such as CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy The
court stated that these competitors create and control the content provided
to their subscribers.2"' The court later reasoned that the public distribution
and display argument should fail because unlike some of its larger
competitors, "Netcom does not create or control the content of the
information available to its subscribers; it merely provides access to the
Internet, whose content is controlled by no single entity "2 02 The inference
is clear: where an ISP that "creates or controls" its content, such as
America Online, is faced with similar charges, the court apparently would
rule against the ISP
The court also dealt with the issues of contributory and vicarious
infringement. However, it found there were unresolved questions of fact
regarding whether Netcom had the requisite knowledge of the infringing
activity, whetherNetcom substantiallyparticipatedinthe infringement, and
whether Netcom had a valid defense to these claims. The court ultimately
demed Netcom's motion for summary judgment based on contributory
infringement but granted the motion regarding direct and vicarious
mfringement.20 3 While Religious Technology Center may appear to be a
victory for some ISPs, the complexity of the issues and the strained logic
needed to deal with conflicting case law raise more questions than are
answered.
CONCLUSION
The information revolution has changed the very nature of societal
interaction, whether it be in the local community, nationwide, or world-
wide. Such changes have arguably not been encountered since the
Industrial Revolution. The question remains whether the legal system has
been and will be able to maintain pace with the technological advances
that, at times, appear to be occurring on a daily basis. The Digital
Millennum Copyright Act is indeed a much-needed piece of legislation
and has, at the very least, shed light on the legal uncertainties that
accompany new technology The limited liability for ISPs providedby Title
II of the Act was an important move forward in protecting the incentives
to make technological advances.
20 See id. at 1368.
202 Id. at 1372.
203 See Id. at 1381, 1383.
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Unfortunately, Title II of the Act is long, complex, and extremely
formalistic. aefore obtaining the limitations on liability, an ISP must first
qualify under one or both of two separate definitions of "service provider"
and qualify under two conditions for eligibility which each have separate
qualifications. Once anISP has passedthesethresholdrequirements it must
then qualify under the complex and specific conditions for each particular
limitation on liability However, because of its formalistic nature, the Act
also creates a number of potential stumbling blocks, any one ofwhich will
disqualify the ISP from the limitations on liability In the event an ISP is
disqualified, the strained and conflicting legal precedent interpreting basic
copyright law ceases to be only a specter and becomes a very real
nightmare. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act indicates that this is
exactly what Congress mtended.2
Thus, the question remains whether a complex statutory addition to
clearly unsuitable existing copyright law will remedy the problem or
simply provide a temporary and unsatisfactory answer. Technology is now
moving faster than the law, and it remains to be seen if the law's attempts
at advancement will be both timely and thoughtful.
24 There have been several cases relevant to service provider liability for
copyright infringement. Most have approached the issue from the
standpoint of contributory and vicarious liability. Rather than embarking
upon awholesale clarification of these doctrines, the Committee decided to
leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of "safe
harbors," for certain common activities of service providers. A service
provider which qualifies for a safe harbor, receives the benefit of limited
liability.
S. REP No. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
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